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Abstract: Many authors discuss judicial oversight of agency actions. Our 
subject, which is less well examined, is agencies’ role in modulating that 
oversight. We consider cases in which the timing or form of an agency ac-
tion has curtailed judicial review of the agency’s policy choices. In some 
such cases, the agency’s choice of form deprived the court of statutory or 
Article III jurisdiction. In others, the court chose to delay or deny review to 
avoid interfering with agency policy development. Despite these differ-
ences, though, all such “reviewability” cases pose important constitutional 
questions about the degree to which an agency should be able to limit judi-
cial oversight of its activities. We argue that courts pay too little attention to 
these questions, and we propose a more systematic framework for evaluat-
ing the constitutional implications of allowing an agency to modulate the 
availability of judicial review by manipulating the structure of its actions. 
Introduction 
The “dominant narrative of modern administrative law” states that 
courts are “key players who help tame, and thereby legitimate, the ex-
ercise of administrative power.”1 This narrative underlies the U.S. Su-
© 2011, Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter. 
* Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. J.D., Catholic University,
2010, summa cum laude. I would like to thank Professor Leiter for inviting me to join her 
in this venture. 
** Associate Professor of Law, American University’s Washington College of Law. Many 
thanks to Catholic University’s Columbus School of Law and Dean Veryl Miles for support-
ing this work. Thanks also to Judith Childers, Louis Cohen, Cara Drinan, Amanda Frost, 
RonNell Andersen Jones, Megan La Belle, James Merrill, Caprice Roberts, Sam Sankar, 
Glen Staszewski, Robert Tsai, and David Zaring for, in varying measures, terrific research 
assistance, sound advice, good insights, and honest edits. 
1 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1413 
(2004); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965) 
(“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logi-
cally, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally va-
lid.”); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 
72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 1023 (1997) (stating that judicial review has the potential to 
“contribut[e] . . . to the legitimation of the regulatory process”); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
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preme Court’s familiar “presumption favoring judicial review of admin-
istrative action.”2 The narrative also explains the Court’s viscerally 
negative reaction to the suggestion, in the 2010 case Kucana v. Holder,3 
that ambiguous language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
should be read to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to 
shield certain of his asylum decisions from court review.4 Such an “ex-
traordinary delegation,” the Kucana Court said, would give “the Execu-
tive . . . a free hand to shelter its own decisions from abuse-of-discretion 
appellate court” oversight.5 Lower courts, too, have objected to the 
seeming irregularity of permitting agencies to shelter their decisions 
from review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, for 
example, has stated (without citation) that it is “axiomatic” that Con-
gress cannot delegate to an agency the power “to oust state courts and 
federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”6 If agencies could 
hide their actions from judicial oversight, the dominant narrative asks, 
what would ensure the fundamental lawfulness of those actions? 
 Anyone familiar with the convoluted question of “reviewability”7 in 
administrative law must acknowledge, though, that agencies regularly 
act in ways that either restrict courts’ jurisdiction or otherwise limit ju-
dicial review. In other words, agencies frequently do “shelter [their] 
own decisions” from court oversight.8 More curiously, in reviewability 
cases, in contrast to statutory interpretation cases like Kucana, courts 
often acquiesce in the resulting curtailment of their purview.9 
Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2350 (2001) (identifying “judicial review” as “a 
simple, if sometimes imperfect, solution to the problem” of presidential lawlessness). 
2 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839 (2010); see also Gutierrez de Martinez v. La-
magno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995) (recognizing the presumption); Reno v. Catholic Soc. 
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64 (1993) (same); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 
U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (noting the “well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of 
statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action”); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam-
ily Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (invoking the presumption); Abbott Labs. v. Gard-
ner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (same). 
3 130 S. Ct. at 839–40. One of the authors, Amanda C. Leiter, was appointed by the 
Court to serve as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below for this case. 
4 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended 
in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)). 
5 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839–40. 
6 Miller v. FCC, 66 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Carlyle Towers Condo. 
Ass’n v. FDIC, 170 F.3d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic’ that agencies can nei-
ther grant nor curtail federal court jurisdiction . . . .”). But see Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 
531 F.3d 884, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s “axiomatic” dicta). 
7 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 1217–1400 (5th 
ed. 2010) (discussing reviewability doctrines). 
8 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839–40. 
9 See infra notes 133–248 and accompanying text. 
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Three examples prove this point. First, “[g]enerally speaking, it is 
much more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain judicial review of agency 
inaction . . . than of agency action.”10 Yet the decision to refrain from 
regulating or taking an enforcement action does as much to delimit the 
relevant statutory and regulatory regime as would any reviewable rule-
making or prosecution. Consider, for example, the paradigmatic inac-
tion case of Heckler v. Chaney, decided by the Supreme Court in 1985.11 
In Heckler, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decided not to 
enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s (FDCA) “misbranding” 
provisions, which prohibit the “unapproved use of an approved drug,” 
against two states that were using otherwise-approved drugs in prison 
executions without FDA approval.12 The Supreme Court declared the 
FDA’s non-enforcement decision “presumptively unreviewable.”13 Plain-
ly, though, the agency’s choice not to enforce the misbranding provi-
sions in the execution context embodied substantive decisions about 
enforcement priorities and, in turn, about the limits of the provisions’ 
reach. As a practical matter, a statute’s prohibitions extend only as far as 
the implementing agency is prepared to enforce them. As Heckler makes 
clear, therefore, agencies shield some policy choices from judicial over-
sight when they decline to act.14 
Second, some statutes permit agencies to establish administrative 
review schemes that must be exhausted before an affected individual 
may obtain judicial review. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA), for example, an inmate who asserts that prison officials have 
violated his civil rights must exhaust any applicable prison review pro-
cedures before he may file suit in federal court.15 If he fails to exhaust 
10 Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and 
Inaction, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 461, 465 (2008); see Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1157, 1188 (2009) (“Although agency inaction is sometimes grounds for legal challenge, in 
practice it is extremely difficult to drag an agency into court to defend its policymaking 
reticence.”); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s deci-
sion not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review 
under [section] 701(a)(2) [of the Administrative Procedure Act].”). But see Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (reviewing the EPA’s denial of a petition for rulemak-
ing).
11 470 U.S. at 823–24. 
12 Id. (citing a prior version of 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)). 
13 Id. at 832–33. 
14 See id. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbi-
trariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657 (2004) (arguing that current law on agency inac-
tion allows agencies to shelter arbitrary decisions from outside oversight). 
15 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (citing a prior version of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a)).
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these remedies within applicable time limits, he may find himself per-
manently barred from obtaining federal court review of his civil rights 
claim.16 Thus, agencies can (and do) curtail court review of their ac-
tions by establishing administrative review procedures that are suffi-
ciently onerous (without violating due process protections17) to dis-
suade or bar some claimants.18 
 Finally, some statutes restrict the categories of agency action that 
courts may review. For instance, the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and numerous substantive statutes limit judicial review to final 
agency actions.19 Other statutes are still more restrictive. The Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA), for example, limits review to final Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission decisions “granting, suspending, revoking, or amend-
ing” a nuclear power facility’s license or construction permit.20 Under 
provisions like these, “[t]he form of the regulatory action dictates the 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. 
17 A state bureau of prisons that attempted to curtail judicial review by establishing an 
absurdly onerous administrative exhaustion precondition—such as a requirement to file 
any administrative grievance within an hour of an alleged civil rights abuse—would pre-
sumably run afoul of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1. The Ngo majority declined to reach this question, but it did not take issue with 
the fifteen-working-day period of limitations imposed under California law. 548 U.S. at 86, 
102–03. 
Respondent contends that requiring proper exhaustion will lead prison ad-
ministrators to devise procedural requirements that are designed to trap un-
wary prisoners and thus to defeat their claims. . . . [W]ith respect to the pos-
sibility that prisons might create procedural requirements for the purpose of 
tripping up all but the most skillful prisoners, while Congress repealed the 
“plain, speedy, and effective” standard, we have no occasion here to decide 
how such situations might be addressed. 
Id. at 102–03 (citation omitted). 
18 See id. at 118 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
[T]he Court’s engraftment of a procedural default sanction into the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement risks barring [meritorious] claims when a prisoner 
fails, inter alia, to file her grievance (perhaps because she correctly fears re-
taliation) within strict time requirements that are generally no more than 15 
days, and that, in nine States, are between 2 and 5 days. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
19 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (APA finality requirement); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006) 
(Immigration and Nationality Act finality requirement for review of removal orders); 10 
U.S.C. § 950g(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (Military Commissions Act finality requirement); 
42 U.S.C. § 2239 (2006) (Atomic Energy Act finality requirement); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 
(Social Security Act finality requirement). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a), (b)(1); see Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 680 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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. . . availability and nature of judicial review.”21 As a result, the imple-
menting agency can choose to begin policy development via ostensibly 
unreviewable forms of action, thereby potentially “immunizing its law-
making from judicial review.”22 
Indeed, the facts of some reviewability cases in this third category 
strongly suggest that the agency deliberately sought to insulate its policy 
choices from court oversight. For example, in Reckitt Benckiser, Inc. v. 
EPA, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2010, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sent a letter to pesticide 
manufacturer Reckitt Benckiser, Inc. (“Reckitt”), stating that, unless the 
company made various safety-enhancing changes to the marketing, 
packaging, and distribution of its rodenticides, the products “would be 
considered misbranded” under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) beginning in June 2011.23 Reckitt sued, claim-
ing the EPA had no authority to issue such a threat without first cancel-
ling the registration of the rodenticides—a move that would have re-
quired the agency to prove its case before an administrative law judge 
and then a federal court of appeals.24 Responding to Reckitt’s suit, the 
EPA asserted that its initial warning letter was neither final nor ripe for 
review.25 The EPA thus sought a regulatory outcome (changes to Reck-
itt’s products), and made two strategic moves in an effort to insulate its 
regulatory activities from court oversight: first proceeding via a warning 
letter rather than a cancellation hearing, and then arguing that the let-
ter itself was unreviewable because it was nonfinal and unripe.26 
As these three examples illustrate, reviewability doctrines enable 
agencies to wield significant de facto control over the scope of court 
oversight. Yet this control is in some tension with both due process 
principles27 and the “[s]eparation-of-powers concerns” that “cau-
tion[ed]” the Kucana Court “against reading legislation, absent clear 
statement, to place in executive hands authority to remove cases from 
the Judiciary’s domain.”28 
21 Magill, supra note 1, at 1420. 
22 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
the EPA’s Periodic Monitoring Guidance, which set out certain requirements for Title V 
permits issued under the Clean Air Act, was final and reviewable despite its “Guidance” title). 
23 613 F.3d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
24 Id. at 1134. 
25 Id. at 1136. 
26 Id. 
27 Ngo, 548 U.S. at 102–03. 
28 130 S. Ct. at 834. 
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To be sure, reviewability doctrines differ in the degree to which 
they curtail judicial authority,29 and in the consequences of that cur-
tailment for regulated entities and concerned third parties.30 Moreover, 
some courts are wise to agency maneuvering and exert oversight author-
ity despite the seemingly unreviewable form or timing of the agency’s 
action. In Reckitt, for example, the D.C. Circuit ultimately deemed the 
EPA’s warning letter both final and ripe despite its epistolary form.31 
Similarly, in a 2000 case, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit 
reviewed an EPA Clean Air Act Guidance despite the apparently non-
binding and nonfinal form of the document (which had not undergone 
notice-and-comment rulemaking).32 The tenor of the Appalachian Power 
opinion is quite telling—although the court purported to apply the tra-
ditional finality inquiry, it prefaced its discussion with a lengthy critique 
of agency efforts to evade APA procedural requirements and judicial 
review provisions. 
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress 
passes a broadly worded statute. The agency follows with regu-
lations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, am-
biguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency 
issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, inter-
preting, defining and often expanding the commands in the 
regulations. . . . Law is made, without notice and comment, 
without public participation, and without publication in the 
Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. . . . An 
agency operating in this way gains a large advantage. “It can 
issue or amend its real rules . . . quickly and inexpensively 
without following any statutorily prescribed procedures.” The 
29 See, e.g., Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that the 
statutory provisions barring review work to strip courts of jurisdiction, whereas the APA’s 
“committed to agency discretion limitation and the final agency action requirement are 
‘not . . . jurisdictional bar[s]’” (quoting Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 524–26 (D.C. Cir. 
2009)) (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 353 n.4 (1984) and Ass’n of 
Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 283 F.3d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. 
2002))). 
30 The exhaustion doctrine, for example, bars review only if the aggrieved party fails to 
take advantage of whatever administrative procedures the agency has created. 
31 Reckitt, 613 F.3d at 1140. The court then left it to the district judge to decide whether 
FIFRA permits the EPA to “bring enforcement proceedings for misbranding before, or rather 
than, regulatory cancellation proceedings . . . .” Id. at 1141. 
32 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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agency may also think there is another advantage—immunizing its 
lawmaking from judicial review.33 
Plainly, the court felt that allowing agencies to achieve significant regu-
latory outcomes via a string of “unreviewable” actions would defeat ad-
ministrative law’s ideals of openness, participation, and oversight.34 
 As Reckitt and Appalachian Power make clear, reviewability doctrines 
are malleable, and agencies and courts alike can manipulate the doc-
trines to achieve widely varying levels of policy oversight.35 The net re-
sult is an unpredictable and ad hoc process in which protection of se-
paration of powers and due process principles depends on the relative 
willingness of agency policymakers (who determine the timing and 
form of an agency’s actions) and judges (who decide whether to acqui-
esce in an agency’s reviewability objection or instead to assert oversight 
authority). In light of “the importance of maintaining a uniform ap-
proach to judicial review of administrative action,”36 we argue that 
courts need a more systematic framework to evaluate the constitutional 
implications of an agency’s efforts to structure its actions so as to limit 
court oversight.37 
 In Part I, we outline such a framework, identifying four constitu-
tional issues that lurk in all reviewability cases.38 Three issues stem from 
separation of powers principles (we term these “Article III infringe-
ment,” “nondelegation,” and “underdelegation”), while one derives 
from the due process right (we term this “individual rights infringe-
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 85 (1995)). 
34 Id. 
35 See Reckitt, 613 F.3d at 1140; Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020. 
36 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 707 (2011)  
(alterations in original) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U. S. 150, 154 (1999)) (discuss-
ing the proper standard for reviewing Treasury Department regulations). Although the 
Mayo Court was extolling the virtue of maintaining a uniform standard of review across 
regulatory subject areas, there is equal value in maintaining uniform standards for deter-
mining whether such review is available at all. 
37 Indeed, except in rare cases like Kucana that squarely present the issue, courts in re-
viewability cases almost never expressly consider whether constitutional principles like 
separation of powers and due process permit an agency to curtail court oversight. Instead, 
judges focus their attention on whichever narrow reviewability doctrines apply in the par-
ticular case, entirely ignoring the fact that the invocation and applicability of those doc-
trines are largely within the agency’s control. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alli-
ance, 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004) (focusing on reviewability of Bureau of Land Management’s 
failure to regulate off-road vehicle use in certain wilderness study areas); Ohio Forestry 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 728–32 (1998) (focusing on ripeness of plaintiffs’ 
challenge to a U.S. Forest Service Land and Resource Management Plan). 
38 See infra notes 49–132 and accompanying text. 
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ment”). Then, in Part II, we turn our attention to a more theoretical 
question: if agencies regularly manipulate the form of their actions to 
“immuniz[e] [their] lawmaking from judicial review,”39 what remains 
of the claim that courts are “key players who help tame, and thereby 
legitimate, the exercise of administrative power”?40 To shed some light 
on this question, we apply our rubric to three recent reviewability cases: 
(1) Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),41 a 2004 case in
which the Supreme Court refused to review the Bureau of Land Man-
agement’s (BLM) failure to regulate off-road vehicle use on pristine
federal lands in Utah; (2) Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club,42 a 1998 case
in which the Supreme Court fleshed out aspects of the ripeness doc-
trine in the context of a dispute about a management plan for Ohio’s
Wayne National Forest; and (3) Amador County v. Salazar,43 a 2011 case
in which the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the Secretary of the Interior
about the reviewability of the Secretary’s “‘no-action’ approval” of an
Indian gaming compact.44
Our analysis of these decisions suggests, counterintuitively, that 
agency manipulation of reviewability doctrines may pose a greater 
threat to congressional authority and executive legitimacy than to judi-
cial authority. Where Congress has created an administrative regime 
that relies on judicial review for its legitimacy, as in the National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA), an agency that invokes reviewability doc-
trines to evade court oversight undermines that legislative vision and, in 
turn, erodes the constitutional foundation for the agency’s own ac-
tions.45 
As a remedy for this and the other potential constitutional infirmi-
ties that lurk in reviewability cases, we suggest that federal courts evalu-
ating a reviewability objection in an administrative law case should rou-
tinely consider the separation of powers and due process implications 
of delaying or denying review. In the majority of reviewability cases, ap-
plication of this rubric would be quite simple, and the outcome of the 
case would not change. As we discuss below, the relevant constitutional 
concerns are rarely implicated. Yet applying the rubric would not be an 
39 Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020. 
40 Magill, supra note 1, at 1413; see infra notes 133–249 and accompanying text. 
41 542 U.S. at 69. 
42 523 U.S. at 733. 
43 640 F.3d at 380. 
44 Id. at 373. 
45 National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered portions of 16 U.S.C. (2006)). 
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empty exercise. Heretofore, courts have largely deferred to agencies’ 
decisions about the form and timing of their actions—even in cases in 
which those decisions have the consequence of deferring or precluding review. 
Like the clear statement rule adopted in Kucana,46 our rubric would 
ensure that courts think twice before allowing an agency to “immu-
niz[e] its lawmaking from judicial review.”47 Further, the rubric would 
provide a sounder footing for decisions like Appalachian Power, in which 
courts choose to assert oversight authority despite the ostensibly unre-
viewable form or timing of the agency’s action.48 
I. The Constitutional Concerns Lurking in Reviewability Cases 
 We posit that executive curtailment of judicial review raises four 
possible constitutional problems. The first three, which we call “Article 
III infringement,” “nondelegation,” and “underdelegation,” arise from 
separation of powers principles and correspond to each of the three 
branches of government—Judicial, Legislative, and Executive, respec-
tively—whose powers might be infringed or improperly aggrandized by 
allowing the form or timing of an agency’s action to affect the scope of 
judicial review. Specifically, Article III infringement covers that narrow 
class of cases in which an agency’s curtailment of the scope of judicial 
review encroaches on some constitutionally irreducible power of the 
federal courts.49 Nondelegation, on the other hand, encompasses two 
potential congressional misdeeds: (1) delegation of “the wrong kind of 
power, i.e., ‘non-Executive’ power”; or (2) delegation of “too much 
power.”50 Finally, underdelegation applies to administrative regimes 
that rely on judicial review of agency action for their legitimacy. When 
Congress has created such a regime, we contend, an agency that struc-
tures its actions so as to curtail or evade review exceeds its statutory 
mandate and delegitimizes the applicable regime. 
 The fourth potential constitutional problem, which we term “indi-
vidual rights infringement,” arises not from the structure of govern-
ment but from the rights of an individual plaintiff, offended by an 
agency’s action but unable to obtain court review. Sometimes, the bar-
                                                                                                                      
46 130 S. Ct. at 834. 
47 Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020. 
48 Id. 
49 But see Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv. L. 
Rev. 869, 874 (2011) (noting that “[m]any commentators have concluded, based on the 
text and structure of Article III, that” Congress’s authority to restrict federal court jurisdic-
tion is “plenary”). 
50 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 480 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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rier to review of the plaintiff’s claim derives from Article III or pruden-
tial limits on judicial interference with the execution of the laws (as 
with a plaintiff who lacks standing to pursue claims).51 In other review-
ability cases, though, the individual or entity injured by agency action 
may have a due process right of access to the courts that the Executive 
may not constitutionally abridge.52 
A. Article III Infringement 
 In evaluating an agency’s claim that something it did (or left un-
done) is unreviewable, the most obvious separation of powers question 
is whether acceding to the agency’s request to curtail review would in-
fringe on some constitutionally irreducible power of the federal courts. 
We label this possibility “Article III infringement.”53 (The conceptually 
distinct issue of whether it is appropriate for the Executive—rather than 
                                                                                                                      
51 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–49 (2009) (noting that 
the standing inquiry “reflect[s] [a] fundamental limitation” on the power of the federal 
courts, constraining them to “redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to 
persons caused by private or official violation of law,” not to “review and revise legislative 
and executive action”). But see, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a 
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 Yale L.J. 816, 817–18 (1969); Heather Elliott, Congress’s In-
ability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 168 n.39 (2011) (noting that “a num-
ber of scholars have demonstrated that [the standing doctrine’s] strict limitations to access 
to the courts would have been foreign to the Founders” (citing Cass R. Sunstein, What’s 
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 170–79 
(1992))); George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in Environ-
mental Cases, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,028, 10,034–37 (1999). 
52 The Supreme Court has recently observed, for example, that a U.S. citizen is enti-
tled to “make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his 
Government,” even if that citizen is detained as an enemy combatant. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004); see also South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 393 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “Congress cannot, consistently 
with due process, deny a taxpayer with property rights at stake all opportunity for an ulti-
mate judicial determination of the legality of a tax assessment against him”). 
53 There is, of course, a different sort of Article III problem that could arise in some 
reviewability cases: a court’s decision to deny review of an agency’s action could, in theory, 
infringe a plaintiff’s “‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from poten-
tial domination by other branches of government.’” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 
(1980)). That is, there could be an individual Article III right distinct from the structural 
right. That said, the Court has had “little occasion to discuss the nature or significance” of 
this individual Article III safeguard. Id. We therefore assume, for purposes of this Article, 
that if Article III does indeed bestow an individual right of access to the courts in some 
cases, that right is adequately protected by enforcing the individual’s due process rights, 
on the one hand, and Article III’s structural protections, on the other. The latter is the 
subject of the present discussion; the former is discussed below. See infra notes 113–132 
and accompanying text. 
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Congress—to wield authority over court jurisdiction is addressed below 
under “Nondelegation.”) 
 Whether federal courts enjoy a constitutionally protected domain 
is a subject of longstanding debate.54 The “traditional view”55 contends 
that the text of Article III—specifically (1) the Exceptions and Regula-
tions Clause, which subjects the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
to “such Exceptions, and . . . Regulations as the Congress shall make”;56 
and (2) the belittling reference in Section 1 to “such inferior courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”57—gives 
Congress plenary power to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction and the inferior courts’ original and appellate jurisdiction.58 
Other theorists argue, though, that the structure if not the text of the 
Constitution provides some limits on Congress’s authority in this re-
gard.59 One of the participants in Henry M. Hart, Jr.’s dialogue, for ex-
ample, famously suggests that “the exceptions [to the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                      
54 See Grove, supra note 49, at 870 (outlining the debate). 
55 Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1885 n.4 (2008) 
(identifying proponents of this view). 
56 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
57 Id. art. III, § 1. 
58 See Grove, supra note 49, at 874–75 (identifying the textual support for this tradi-
tional view and citing, among others, John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 204 (1997); Martin 
H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1633, 1637 (1990); and Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965)). 
59 It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the many authors who have recently 
expounded this less traditional view. For a few key examples, see Akhil Reed Amar, Taking 
Article III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 442, 445 (1991); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opin-
ions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1005 (2007) (“Simply 
put, Article III requires that the federal judiciary be able to exercise all of the judicial pow-
er of the United States that is vested by the Constitution and that the Supreme Court must 
have the final judicial word in all cases . . . that raise federal issues.”); Laurence Claus, The 
One Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 Geo. L.J. 
59, 64 (2007) (“Congress cannot use its Exceptions power to achieve particular desired 
answers to questions that fall within the judicial Power of the United States.”). 
[M]y root textual argument is this: Article III plainly requires that the judicial 
power of the United States “shall [that is, must] be vested” in the federal judi-
ciary, which includes one Supreme Court that “shall” (again, must) be estab-
lished, and inferior federal courts that “may,” but need not, be created. And 
that very same “judicial power shall [here too, must] extend,” in the form of 
either original or appellate jurisdiction, “to all cases” involving federal ques-
tions, admiralty, and ambassadors. 
Amar, supra, at 445 (alterations in original). 
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appellate jurisdiction] must not be such as will destroy the essential role 
of the . . . Court in the constitutional plan.”60 
 We need not take a side in this debate. For our purposes, it is suffi-
cient to identify the implications of the debate for reviewability cases: if 
Article III restricts Congress’s authority to strip federal courts of certain 
kinds of jurisdiction, then of course those restrictions extend at least 
equally to executive encroachment on the judicial sphere. It is there-
fore possible that in some small subset of reviewability cases, an agen-
cy’s erection of a jurisdictional roadblock (as, for example, when an 
agency decides to proceed via some statutorily unreviewable form of 
action61) could infringe on the courts’ constitutionally protected 
sphere. Importantly, however, this problem can arise only in those cases 
in which an agency raises a truly jurisdictional, rather than prudential, 
reviewability objection.62 The reason is straightforward: the objection 
must be jurisdictional in nature because a court’s constitutionally pro-
tected sphere of influence cannot be threatened by the court’s own de-
cision to delay or deny review for purely discretionary reasons.63 
 As for the mechanics of assessing whether Article III infringement 
is present, a court must ask itself only whether the Constitution would 
permit Congress to limit judicial review in the way that the agency pur-
ports to do. If Congress could do so, then the agency’s assertion of the 
same authority may pose nondelegation, underdelegation, or individ-
ual rights problems, all of which are discussed below, but it does not 
infringe on an irreducible power of the courts. 
B. Nondelegation 
 The next separation of powers question lurking in reviewability 
cases is whether the agency plausibly has authority to limit judicial re-
view in the way it attempts to. This is really a two-part question. First, 
does the Constitution permit Congress to grant the agency the authority 
                                                                                                                      
60 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953). For a comprehensive discussion of 
the current state of the literature on the issue of Congress’s power to strip the Supreme 
Court of appellate jurisdiction and federal inferior courts of appellate and original juris-
diction, see generally Grove, supra note 49. 
61 See Block, 467 U.S. at 353 n.4 (“[C]ongressional preclusion of judicial review is in ef-
fect jurisdictional . . . .”). 
62 See Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 380 (distinguishing between reviewability arguments 
that are jurisdictional and those that are prudential). 
63 See id. 
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to curtail court oversight? Second, did Congress grant the agency that 
authority in the relevant statute? 
Our rubric addresses the first part of this compound question un-
der the heading “Nondelegation.” Complicating matters, nondelegation 
itself has two subparts, both flagged by Justice Breyer in his dissenting 
opinion in the 1998 Supreme Court case Clinton v. City of New York.64 
First, at least in theory, Congress may have delegated the wrong kind of 
power to the agency—as, to use an extreme example, if Congress passed 
a statute calling on the EPA to “write all laws necessary for protection of 
the environment” (thereby delegating true legislative power to an agen-
cy).65 Second, Congress may have delegated too much power to the agen-
cy, even though that power has the right constitutional flavor.66 To con-
tinue the above example, this kind of nondelegation problem would be 
present in a statute that called on the EPA to “issue regulations to pro-
tect clean air.” Now the problem is not that the delegated power is for-
mally legislative (“write all laws”), but instead that the power is function-
ally legislative—Congress wrote a statute so broad, and so lacking in 
content, that the agency is left to make all of the difficult policy choices 
about how to achieve Congress’s ill-defined objective.67 
The former, more clear-cut nondelegation problem almost never 
arises because it is the rare statute that expressly delegates pure legisla-
tive power to an agency.68 That said, in the 1892 Supreme Court case 
64 524 U.S. at 480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 416–17, 419–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between the nature and 
the extent of a delegation). 
65 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding—contrary to the plurality’s 
view—that section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 runs afoul of 
the nondelegation doctrine in part because Congress avoided “hard choices” that were 
“both fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet politically so divisive that the neces-
sary decision or compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legisla-
tive forge”). 
68 But see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In evaluating the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines, Justice Scalia concluded: 
In the present case, . . . a pure delegation of legislative power is precisely what 
we have before us. It is irrelevant whether the standards [for writing the 
Guidelines] are adequate, because they are not standards related to the exer-
cise of executive or judicial powers; they are, plainly and simply, standards for 
further legislation. 
Id. 
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Field v. Clark, the Court clearly indicated its view of this kind of congres-
sional abdication: 
That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the presi-
dent is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integ-
rity and maintenance of the system of government ordained 
by the Constitution. . . . “The true distinction . . . is between 
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily in-
volves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring au-
thority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under 
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the 
latter no valid objection can be made.”69 
 The real difficulty arises, of course, in determining whether a stat-
ute is so vague and lacking in standards that it effectively delegates 
“power to make the law” even as it purports only to grant “authority or 
discretion as to [the law’s] execution.”70 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently (if not very stringently) policed this line by requiring that 
“when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies [it] 
must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’”71 
 In practice, the intelligible principle requirement does little to 
constrain Congress’s ability to transfer sweeping quasi-legislative au-
thority to agencies. 
In the history of the Court [it has] found the requisite “intel-
ligible principle” lacking in only two statutes, one of which 
provided literally no guidance for the exercise of [agency] 
discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to re-
gulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a 
standard than stimulating the economy by assuring “fair com-
petition.”72 
 On the other hand, “the Court has upheld congressional delega-
tions based upon the ‘vague and indefinite’ principles of ‘public inter-
est, convenience, or necessity,’ and what is ‘generally fair and equita-
                                                                                                                      
69 143 U.S. 649, 692–94 (1892) (emphasis added) (quoting Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. v. 
Comm’rs of Clinton Cnty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88–89 (1852)). 
70 Id. 
71 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citation omitted). 
72 Id. at 474. 
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ble,’ or ‘requisite . . . to protect the public health.’”73 If the “intelligible 
principle” doctrine retains any force, therefore, it is in its use as an in-
terpretive guide for narrowing ambiguous statutory language that, read 
broadly, would give an agency too little guidance about how to pro-
ceed.74 The “doctrine, in other words, now operates exclusively 
through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of serious constitu-
tional questions.”75 Interpret ambiguous statutory language narrowly, 
the doctrine instructs, to avoid the delegation of “excessively open-
ended authority to the President.”76 
                                                                                                                     
 To apply the nondelegation doctrine to reviewability cases, courts 
must first identify the type of power an agency wields when it claims that 
an action is unreviewable because, for example, the action is nonfinal or 
unripe, or administrative remedies remain unexhausted. There are 
three possibilities. First, if the agency’s reviewability objection calls on 
the court to exercise truly prudential authority to delay or deny review 
(as with some ripeness77 arguments, for example), then the agency is 
merely engaging in a conversation with the court about the best uses of 
the agency’s and the court’s time and expertise. In such a case, there is 
no need to apply the nondelegation doctrine, because the agency is dis-
cussing the efficient execution of the relevant laws (an eminently execu-
tive function) rather than wielding a delegated power over the courts. 
Second, if the agency’s reviewability objection goes to the very existence 
of “a justiciable case or controversy under Article III”78 (as with many 
 
73 Bryan Clark, Comment, Refining the Nondelegation Doctrine in Light of REAL ID Act 
102(c): Time to Stop Bulldozing Constitutional Barriers for a Border Fence, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
851, 860 (2009). 
74 Mistretta, 488 U. S. at 373 n.7 (“In recent years, our application of the nondelegation 
doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more 
particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise 
be thought to be unconstitutional.”). 
75 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Cannon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 223, 223. 
76 Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 
67–68 (2009). 
77 “The ripeness doctrine is ‘drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power 
and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction . . . .’” Nat’l Park Hospi-
tality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (quoting Reno v. Catholic 
Social Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). Here we refer only to the prudential as-
pects of ripeness, such as the “‘[p]roblems of prematurity and abstractness’ that may pre-
vent adjudication in all but the exceptional case.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976) 
(quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972)). 
78 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010). 
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standing79 arguments), then the agency is merely reminding the court 
of preexisting constitutional limits on judicial authority. Again, the non-
delegation doctrine is not relevant to such a case, because the limits on 
the court’s authority derive from the Constitution rather than from any 
affirmative assertion by the agency of delegated power to curtail court 
oversight. 
 The third possibility is more interesting. If the agency asserts that 
the form or timing of its action narrows the court’s purview, then the 
agency is effectively wielding power over the court’s jurisdiction. The 
same is true if the agency argues that jurisdiction is lacking because the 
plaintiff failed to exhaust an agency-created administrative remedy. In 
either case, the agency is effectively arguing that something it did (or 
failed to do, or some administrative review scheme that it created) has 
the effect of narrowing the Judiciary’s sphere of influence. The only 
possible constitutional root of such power is Congress’s authority, in 
Article III, to “ordain and establish . . . inferior courts,”80 and to “regu-
lat[e]” and “make . . . exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s “appellate 
jurisdiction.”81 If an agency argues that its affirmative choices have con-
sequences for the scope of court jurisdiction, the agency must be wield-
ing delegated legislative authority over the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 
 The Supreme Court long ago accepted that Congress may delegate 
the power “‘to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts’” 
to another branch of government.82 Justice Blackmun summarized this 
history in 1989 in Mistretta v. United States, an unsuccessful nondelega-
tion challenge to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s authority to 
promulgate sentencing guidelines for the Judiciary: 
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., . . . we upheld a challenge to certain 
rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 
which conferred upon the Judiciary the power to promulgate 
federal rules of civil procedure. . . . We observed: “Congress 
                                                                                                                      
79 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Though some of its ele-
ments express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, 
the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.”). 
80 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”) (emphasis added). 
81 Id. art. III, § 2 (“In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regu-
lations as the Congress shall make.”) (emphasis added). 
82 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941)). 
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has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure 
of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to 
this or other federal courts authority to make rules not incon-
sistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States.” 
. . . This passage in Sibbach simply echoed what had been our 
view since Wayman v. Southard, decided more than a century 
earlier, where Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that 
rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch may be 
“conferred on the judicial department.”83 
 The Mistretta Court recognized, however, that while Congress may 
confer “rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch . . . on the 
judicial department,”84 it is an entirely different question whether Con-
gress may confer that power on an executive agency. As the Court ob-
served, “had Congress decided to confer responsibility for promulgat-
ing sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch,” the resulting stat-
ute might “unconstitutionally . . . assign[] judicial responsibilities to the 
Executive or unconstitutionally . . . unite[] the power to prosecute and 
the power to sentence within one Branch.”85 Intelligible principles 
aside, the Constitution may restrict Congress’s ability to delegate to an 
executive agency the authority to curtail judicial review.86 
 For our discussion of reviewability doctrines, the relevant point is 
that to assess nondelegation issues in a reviewability case, the court 
must apply a four-pronged nondelegation doctrine. The first and sec-
ond prongs are familiar. First, the court must assure itself, as usual, that 
in permitting an agency to limit review by modifying the form or timing 
of its action, or by establishing exhaustion procedures, Congress has 
not inappropriately granted the agency true lawmaking power. Deter-
mining the appropriate form and timing of a communication with 
regulated entities is plainly at least somewhat executive in nature, as is 
establishing internal agency review procedures by which an agency can 
double-check its own initial decisions.87 Second, also as usual, the court 
must evaluate whether the statute in question provides an intelligible 
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9–10; Wayman v. Southard, 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)); see also Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 242 (2005) 
(expressly noting that nothing in the decision “call[s] into question any aspect of our deci-
sion in Mistretta”). 
84 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
85 Id. at 391 n.17. 
86 See id. 
87 Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Con-
gress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”). 
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principle that adequately constrains the agency’s choices about form, 
timing, and exhaustion. This will be a question of statutory interpreta-
tion, and may require the court to adopt a narrowing construction of 
the governing laws for the reasons discussed above.88 
 But the inquiry cannot stop there. Rather, the court must also ask 
itself whether the statute in question improperly delegates “judicial re-
sponsibilities to the Executive.”89 This third question is parallel to the 
first, though in this case it turns on the judicial, rather than the legisla-
tive, nature of the delegated power. That said, just as “a certain degree 
of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judi-
cial action,”90 a certain degree of discretion over the conduct of a case, 
and thus of judicial responsibility, inheres in the prosecutorial func-
tion.91 As with delegations of quasi-legislative power, therefore, “it is up 
to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory 
commands, to determine—up to a point—how small or how large”92 
the agency’s judicial responsibility shall be. And, as with ordinary dele-
gations of quasi-legislative authority, courts can ensure that Congress 
never passes the elusive constitutional endpoint by again using the “in-
telligible principle” doctrine—the fourth prong of our expanded non-
delegation inquiry—as an interpretive guide to narrow ambiguous lan-
guage that might otherwise grant an agency too much authority over 
the scope of judicial review. 
 What does all of this mean in practice? The answer is far simpler 
than the above discussion would suggest. In a reviewability case, the 
court should ask itself not only the usual nondelegation questions, but 
also whether the relevant statute includes an adequate intelligible prin-
ciple to constrain those agency choices that are relevant to reviewability, 
including choices about the timing and form of the agency’s action and 
the interposition of administrative review procedures. 
C. Underdelegation 
 Assuming that the governing statute satisfies this augmented non-
delegation test, the final separation of powers question is whether the 
relevant statute in fact delegates to the agency the authority to limit 
                                                                                                                      
88 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
89 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 n.17 (emphasis added). 
90 Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91 To take just one obvious example, when the government is the plaintiff or prosecu-
tor, it drafts the complaint and chooses (within limits) the date on which to file; thus, it 
controls the timing and content of the ensuing case. 
92 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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court oversight. Like nondelegation, this question raises an issue of sta-
tutory construction. Now, though, the issue is no longer whether the 
Constitution permits Congress to delegate to an executive agency some 
authority over court jurisdiction, but whether Congress intended to 
delegate to this agency, in this context, the authority to take advantage 
of jurisdictional or prudential limits on court oversight. 
 If Congress says, in no uncertain terms, “Agency X’s decisions are 
reviewable to the extent prescribed by Agency X,” then Congress plainly 
intended the agency to choose which of its decisions to shelter from re-
view. If, on the other hand, the governing statute includes a broad judi-
cial review provision, then the agency’s invocation of a reviewability limit 
to shield agency policy choices from court oversight threatens to evis-
cerate the very remedy that Congress hoped would keep the agency in 
check. In the latter situation, the problem is not that Congress could not 
constitutionally delegate to the agency the authority to limit judicial re-
view in the identified manner (nondelegation), but rather that Con-
gress did not so delegate (underdelegation). Congress intended to make 
review broadly available; the agency undermines that intent when it 
wields the form or content of its action, or the presence of an exhaus-
tion requirement, as a shield against court oversight. 
 We illustrate this concern, which we term “underdelegation,” with 
a hypothetical that avoids the complexity of most real world statutes. 
Suppose Congress passes a statute, the Forest Products Act, that (1) 
creates a procedure for obtaining a logging permit; (2) identifies cer-
tain factual prerequisites (such as age of stand, location of stand, and 
previous logging history) that any applicant must establish prior to ob-
taining a permit; (3) entrusts the evaluation of permit applications to a 
Logging Review Board; and (4) includes a judicial review provision that 
states, “Any party aggrieved by the Board’s decision granting or denying 
a logging permit may, within sixty days after its entry, file a petition to 
review the decision in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.”93 Sup-
pose further that the purpose of the review provision was to ensure that 
anyone aggrieved by the Board’s choices would have easy and rapid ac-
cess to a judicial remedy. 
 Imagine next that the Logging Review Board creates an onerous 
administrative reconsideration procedure under which all permit ap-
plicants and opponents must file motions to reconsider with the Board 
                                                                                                                      
93 This provision is styled on 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2006), which governs judicial review of 
most alien removal orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2006) (providing that, with some excep-
tions, “[j]udicial review of a final order of removal . . . is governed only by [28 U.S.C. 
§ 2344]”). 
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before they may obtain judicial review of a permit decision. Moreover, 
suppose the Board imposes a ten-day filing deadline for reconsidera-
tion motions. Finally, imagine that the Board denies a permit to a small 
logging company, and the company fails to file the required reconsid-
eration motion within the ten-day window, instead going directly to the 
appropriate circuit court on day fifteen. 
In this scenario, if the Logging Review Board moves to dismiss on 
exhaustion grounds, and the court agrees to dismiss the challenge, the 
court is effectively approving the Board’s effort to protect its permitting 
decisions from review. More important for our purposes, the court is 
doing so in spite of clear congressional intent to create a judicial remedy 
that is broader than the Board’s ten-day limit allows. This is a paradig-
matic example of underdelegation: Congress paved the way for expan-
sive judicial review; the agency threw up procedural roadblocks that it 
had no clear statutory authority to erect; and the court honored those 
roadblocks, permitting the agency to exercise undelegated authority 
over judicial review and, in the process, to thwart Congress’s intent.94 
As this example illustrates, the problem of underdelegation is not 
one of congressional power but one of congressional intent. As such, 
Congress can easily overcome any underdelegation concern by being 
clear about the scope of the agency’s authority. Thus, in the invented 
Forest Products Act, Congress could include a fifth provision that grants 
the Board the authority to “impose any administrative procedures nec-
essary to ensure prompt, thorough, and accurate review of all logging 
permit applications.” Now the Board has a plausible argument that Con-
gress did grant it the authority to establish a reconsideration procedure 
and to make exhaustion of that procedure a prerequisite for judicial 
review. Specifically, the Board can argue: (1) Congress intended it to 
have the opportunity to make “thorough and accurate” determinations 
on all logging permit-related questions; (2) occasionally, reconsidera-
tion may be necessary to ensure both thoroughness and accuracy; and 
(3) the Board must make the reconsideration procedure a prerequisite
to judicial review, because otherwise applicants would choose to forego
it. Now there is constitutional room for a court to accept that an appli-
cant’s failure to exhaust precludes review. In this context, a court that
recognizes the jurisdictional implications of failing to exhaust the re-
consideration procedure is simply deferring to the agency’s reasonable
94 Cf., e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (giving effect to language in the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act that signaled “congressional intent to cast the standing net 
broadly” and thus allowed for expansive judicial review of agency action). 
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reading of the Forest Products Act, rather than approving the Board’s 
attempt to exercise undelegated authority to evade judicial review. 
 Importantly, unlike Article III infringement or nondelegation,95 
the problem of underdelegation can arise whether the agency’s review-
ability argument is jurisdictional or prudential in nature. Under court-
created, prudential reviewability doctrines, the courts withhold review 
in certain circumstances so as not to interfere with ongoing agency pol-
icy development.96 As discussed above,97 these prudential reviewability 
rules, by definition, cannot infringe the Judiciary’s protected sphere 
because the courts make the rules and decide when and whether to 
follow them. Likewise, these prudential rules do not pose a nondelega-
tion problem, because the rules generally hinge on the timing and 
form of the agency’s actions98—choices that are patently executive in 
nature.99 But if the relevant statute indicates Congress’s intent that the 
agency’s actions be broadly reviewable regardless of timing or form, 
then the agency’s invocation of a prudential limit on review can in-
fringe on Congress’s authority. Congress limited its delegation of quasi-
legislative power to the agency, granting the agency the power to for-
mulate policy, but only with judicial oversight. The agency flouted that 
restriction on its authority by wielding the timing and form of its action 
as a shield to review. From Congress’s point of view, the fact that the 
resulting shield is prudential rather than jurisdictional is irrelevant— 
the agency has exceeded its statutory authority by formulating policy 
without judicial oversight. 
 How, then, should a court assess underdelegation in a case in 
which a complainant has challenged an agency’s action or policy, and 
the agency has raised a reviewability objection such as inaction, finality, 
ripeness, or exhaustion? The issue is one of statutory interpretation, 
                                                                                                                      
95 See supra notes 53–92 and accompanying text. 
96 See, e.g., Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 380 (distinguishing between reviewability argu-
ments that are jurisdictional and those that are prudential in nature). 
97 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
98 See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
[T]he primary focus of the ripeness doctrine as it concerns judicial review of 
agency action has been a prudential attempt to time review in a way that bal-
ances the petitioner’s interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful 
agency action against the agency’s interest in crystallizing its policy before 
that policy is subjected to judicial review and the court’s interests in avoiding 
unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting. 
Id. 
99 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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with which courts are well acquainted.100 Three possibilities present 
themselves. First, the statute could provide for judicial review of all re-
lated agency actions.101 In the face of this kind of expansive statutory 
language, an agency that purports to erect a “reviewability” barrier to 
court oversight is overreaching. Congress’s intent to allow for judicial 
review “is clear, [and] that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well 
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”102 
 On the opposite extreme, the statute could include express lan-
guage delegating to the agency the authority to delimit the scope of 
judicial review. Congress has not chosen to make such an “extraordi-
nary delegation”103 very often, but there is at least one real-world ex-
ample: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expressly condi-
tions review of common law claims against a foreign sovereign on the 
State Department’s assessment of the sovereign’s terrorist status.104 In 
other words, in the FSIA, Congress expressly delegated to the State De-
partment the authority to make a determination that controls federal 
courts’ jurisdiction to entertain certain common law claims.105 If the 
relevant statute in the reviewability case accomplishes its delegation as 
clearly as the FSIA, the consequence is clear: the court may give effect 
to the agency’s reviewability objection (assuming there are no nondele-
gation, Article III infringement, or individual rights infringement prob-
lems), because the agency wields expressly delegated authority to limit 
court oversight. 
 Finally, the third and most likely possibility is that the statute is 
ambiguous. For example, the statute could contain both a judicial re-
view provision and language that seems to grant the agency broad au-
                                                                                                                      
100 The task of determining congressional intent based on statutory interpretation is 
indeed a familiar one—courts frequently engage in such an inquiry to determine whether 
a regulation should be afforded deference pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). The Chev-
ron inquiry requires courts to discern “‘whether Congress would have intended, and ex-
pected, courts to treat [the regulation] as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of 
“gap-filling” authority.’” Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 714 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, 
Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007)). 
101 Interpreting the APA, for example, the Supreme Court has noted the Act’s “gener-
ous review provisions,” and accordingly has “construed [the] Act not grudgingly but as 
serving a broadly remedial purpose.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
102 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
103 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 840. 
104 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). 
105 See id. 
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thority to choose not to act, to act via nonfinal (and hence unreview-
able) guidelines, to create administrative prerequisites to review, or oth-
erwise to curtail the availability or scope of judicial review. In these 
situations, the court must do what courts do best:106 try to discern the 
enacting Congress’s intent, keeping in mind both the presumption in 
favor of judicial review of executive action107 and the principle articu-
lated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., that 
courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous sta-
tutory provisions.108 
Most cases, of course, will fall into this third category, because, as 
“the famous hypothetical statute, ‘No vehicles shall be allowed in the 
park,’”109 illustrates, statutory language is almost always subject to mul-
tiple plausible interpretations. But the fact that our suggested under-
delegation analysis rarely provides a clear answer and instead requires 
resort to presumptions and principles does not mean that courts 
should skip the analysis altogether. As the below discussion of Ohio For-
estry proves,110 in some reviewability cases, a careful reading of the stat-
ute would reveal that Congress intended to provide for broad judicial 
review. In those cases, a court that nevertheless permits the agency to 
invoke reviewability doctrines to evade review is sanctioning an uncon-
106 See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[U]nder 
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes . . . .”); 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the “proper role” of the judiciary “in construing statutes . . . is to interpret them so 
as to give effect to congressional intention”); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound 
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the 
operation of each.”). 
107 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting that the availability of judicial re-
view is necessary to legitimate agency action). 
108 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
[I]f [a] statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute. . . . [In which case] a court may not substitute
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
109 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Con-
sensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1761 (2010). 
110 See infra notes 176–225 and accompanying text. 
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stitutional expansion of agency authority at the expense of both con-
gressional authority111 and agency legitimacy.112 
D. Individual Rights Infringement 
 Finally, we note that an agency’s invocation of the exhaustion doc-
trine or another reviewability objection could, in theory, violate the 
rights of the plaintiff who is challenging his treatment at the hands of 
the agency. “Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to 
the plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III 
court,”113 but plainly the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,114 
and perhaps also Article III itself,115 protect an individual’s right to 
“make his way to court with” certain kinds of challenges to agency ac-
tion.116 A court that denies review based on an agency’s inaction, final-
ity, ripeness, or exhaustion objection could, therefore, impinge on this 
gh
                                                                                                                     
ri t. 
 The first point to make about this right of access to the federal 
courts is that it can be waived by the individual.117 Thus, the only rele-
vant cases in which “individual rights infringement” could possibly arise 
are those in which an agency has asked the court to curtail review, and 
 
111 Cf. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Ngo, the majority determined 
that, under the PLRA, the respondent’s failure to file an administrative grievance with 
California prison officials was fatal to his attempt to file a section 1983 action against those 
officials. Id. at 93–99 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens disagreed, noting that the PLRA 
has “competing values”: “reducing the number of frivolous filings, on one hand, while 
preserving prisoners’ capacity to file meritorious claims, on the other.” Id. at 117 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). In Justice Stevens’s view, the majority’s decision to give the state’s adminis-
trative remedies jurisdictional significance “frustrate[d] rather than effectuate[d] legisla-
tive intent.” Id. 
112 The agency legitimacy problem, of course, is the flip-side of the presumption in fa-
vor of judicial review: whenever an agency is permitted to escape judicial review, there is a 
concern that the precluded claim may have been meritorious. See, e.g., id. (discussing the 
need to “preserve prisoners’ capacity to file meritorious claims” against prison officials); 
supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
113 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (citing 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985)); Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
114 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
115 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
116 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (observing that a U.S. citizen is entitled to “make his way to 
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his Government,” even if 
that citizen is detained as an enemy combatant). 
117 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848–49 (“[A]s a personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an im-
partial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal 
constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must 
be tried.”). 
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the individual claimant has argued that denying review would infringe 
his due process (or Article III) rights.118 In such a case, the court must 
assess whether delaying, abridging, or denying review would, in fact, 
                                                                                                                     
violate those rights. 
 The remainder of this article focuses on cases that implicate struc-
tural separation of powers issues rather than due process, so we sum-
marize only briefly the due process analysis.119 Due process is generally 
understood to be “flexible” and situation-dependent,120 in essence re-
quiring the government to provide certain procedural safeguards— 
such as notice and a hearing121—before (or sometimes after)122 depriv-
ing a “person” of “life, liberty, or property.”123 The inquiry proceeds in 
two parts. First, the injured party must have a life, liberty, or property 
interest at stake. Of these interests, reviewability cases most often impli-
cate liberty. The paradigmatic fact pattern is that of a litigant (usually a 
prisoner, illegal immigrant, or asylum seeker) who seeks to challenge 
an agency’s handling of himself or his case but is barred from proceed-
 
coming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?
914) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity 
to b
Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 
93 Co
 must generally be provided before a temporary 
Fall
in the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Four-
teen
118 See id. 
119 For a more thorough discussion of the role of due process in constraining agency ac-
tion, see Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process in the Administrative 
State, 46 Ga. L. Rev. (forth
abstract_id=1786669. 
120 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
121 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court consistently has held 
that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property 
interest.”); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (“The failure to accord an accused a 
fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385, 394 (1
e heard.”). 
122 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349 (holding that a pre-deprivation hearing is not required 
prior to terminating the plaintiff’s social security disability benefits); see also Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“‘The hearing must be ‘at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About 
lum. L. Rev. 309, 330 (1993). 
Under the Due Process Clause, government must typically provide notice and 
some kind of hearing before it can lawfully deprive anyone of life, liberty, or 
property. Moreover, when pre-deprivation process is not extensive—as it need 
not be, for example, before someone may be deprived of government em-
ployment—a fuller hearing
deprivation becomes final. 
on, supra, at 330 (footnotes omitted). 
123 U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332 (“Procedural due process 
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or 
‘property’ interests with
th Amendment.”). 
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ing in court because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.124 
The exact contours of the liberty interest are unclear, but as a general 
rule, the term is broadly defined,125 extending not only to freedom 
from confinement by the government but also to “protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights” and to en-
joyment of those “privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the or-
rl
     
de y pursuit of happiness by free men.”126 
 Assuming an individual successfully demonstrates that a chal-
lenged agency action will deprive him of a life, liberty, or property in-
terest, the second part of the inquiry requires the court to assess 
whether any process the individual received “satisf[ies] the dictates of 
minimal due process.”127 To make this assessment, the court must bal-
ance “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; 
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used”; and “the Government’s interest.”128 As a practical mat-
ter, administrative hearings often satisfy this three-factor test.129 Thus, 
the individual may have no right of access to the federal courts. More-
over, many reviewability cases involve finality or ripeness objections in 
                                                                                                                 
124 See, e.g., Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93. 
125 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (“In a Constitution for a free 
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of ‘liberty’ must be broad indeed.”). Al-
though the Court has referred to “liberty” and “property” as “broad and majestic terms,” 
they are not limitless. Id. at 571–75. For example, the Court has found no liberty or prop-
erty interest at stake in at-will public employment, in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343–50 
(1976); “reputation alone,” in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709–12 (1976); foster family 
challenges to removal of foster children to natural parents, in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families 
for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846–47 (1977); and state prison regulations that are not 
“atypical” and do not impose a “significant deprivation,” in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 




e dictates of his own conscience, and 
Roth 3)) (internal quo-
tatio
or Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 517 (1990). 
 of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty 
interest.”). 
 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 727 n.19 (1997) (internal quot
 omitted); Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. 
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right 
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of 
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to th
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
, 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (192
n marks omitted). 
127 Ohio v. Akron Ctr. f
128 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
129 See, e.g., id. at 349. 
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which the agency asks the court not to bar but merely to delay review.130 
The plaintiff in such a case would be hard pressed to argue that the 
resulting delay so threatens her private interests as to deprive her of 
due process.131 Thus, it will be the rare case in which an agency’s re-
viewability objection and a court’s consequent curtailment of review 
implicate an individual plaintiff’s due process rights.132 
rowly on whichever 
vie
                                        
II. Applying the Rubric 
 Each of the four concerns discussed above—Article III infringe-
ment, nondelegation, underdelegation, and individual rights infringe-
ment—serves as an essential check on agency authority to curtail fed-
eral court jurisdiction or otherwise to limit judicial oversight. As noted 
above, however, courts do not systematically evaluate these concerns in 
cases in which an agency argues that its choices have consequences for 
the scope of review. Rather, courts tend to focus nar
re wability doctrine applies in the particular case. 
 We therefore revisit three reviewability cases that implicate our ru-
bric: two from the Supreme Court—the 2004 case Norton v. Southern 
Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),133 and the 1998 case Ohio Forestry Ass’n 
v. Sierra Club134—and one from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, the 2011 case Amador County v. Salazar.135 Our analysis suggests 
that standard reviewability analyses systematically undervalue at least 
one of the constitutional concerns we identify: underdelegation. That 
is, those analyses fail to account for the very real possibility that Con-
gress did not intend for the agency to have the authority to wield the 
                                                                              
130 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 20, Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. 726 (No. 97-16) (arguing 
that forest management plans would not “forever escape review” because aspects of the 
plans would be ripe for review “[o]nce a timber sale creates the concrete factual context 
required for a manageable ripe controversy”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
131 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Arm-
strong, 380 U.S. at 552). Thus, delaying review of a nonfinal agency decision until that deci-
sion actually deprives the plaintiff of some concrete liberty or property interest would 
likely satisfy the flexible requirements of the Due Process Clause. 
132 But see Ngo, 548 U.S. at 117–18, 121–23 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens noted that the Court’s imposition of “procedural default sanction” on a prisoner who 
“fails, inter alia, to file her grievance (perhaps because she correctly fears retaliation) with-
in strict time requirements that are generally no more than 15 days” may “cause the statute 
to be vulnerable to constitutional challenges” because “the Constitution guarantees that 
prisoners, like all citizens, have a reasonably adequate opportunity to raise constitutional 
claims before impartial judges.” Id. 
133 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004). 
134 523 U.S. 726, 728–32 (1998). 
135 640 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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timing or fo  review 
procedure, as a shield 
WA and 
ve
” under section 706(1).142 In prac-
                                                                                                                     
rm of its action, or the existence of an administrative
against court oversight. 
A. SUWA: The BLM Dodges Judicial Review, but Remains  
Within Constitutional Limits 
 SUWA concerned the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) han-
dling of so-called “wilderness study areas” (“WSAs”) in Southern 
Utah.136 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) re-
quires the BLM to manage WSAs “in a manner so as not to impair the 
suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness”137 and “in accor-
dance with . . . land use plans . . . when they are available.”138 SU
se ral other environmental groups alleged that the BLM violated the 
FLPMA’s requirements by failing to protect the Southern Utah WSAs 
from environmental harms caused by off-road vehicle use.139 
 The question before the Court in SUWA was whether section 
706(1) of the APA, which empowers courts to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”140 authorized the court 
to review the BLM’s “failure to act to protect public lands in Utah from 
damage caused by [off-road vehicle] use”141—that is, whether the 
BLM’s failure to act in this context constituted action “unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed” within the meaning of the APA. The 
Court concluded that the FLPMA does not mandate the kind of con-
crete actions that courts can “compel
tical terms, the decision means that courts lack authority under the 
APA to review the BLM’s failure to take action against at least some 
harmful land use practices in WSAs. 
 
2(c) (2006). 
SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59 (cit-
ing 
2 U.S. at 66. 
136 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59. 
137 43 U.S.C. § 178
138 Id. § 1732(a). 
139 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 60–61. 
140 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006). 
141 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 61. In managing public lands, the Secretary of the Interior, 
through the BLM, must, by regulation or otherwise, “take any action required to prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their resources or to afford environ-
mental protection.” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). The BLM uses land management plans to balance 
environmental protection against other land uses. See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59. Land use 
plans, which the BLM adopts after notice and comment, are “designed to guide and con-
trol future management actions.” 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-2 (2010); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1712; 
SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59. A “land use plan describes, for a particular area, allowable uses, 
goals for future condition of the land, and specific next steps.” 
43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(k)). 
142 SUWA, 54
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 The Court reached this conclusion by narrowly interpreting APA 
section 706(1) to extend only to cases in which “an agency failed to take 
a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”143 The Court then held 
that although the WSA preservation requirement is “mandatory as to 
the object to be achieved,” it “leaves [the] BLM a great deal of discre-
tion in deciding how to achieve” that object.144 As for the land use plans 
that the BLM had developed for the Southern Utah WSAs, the Court 
observed that the FLPMA precludes the agency from taking affirmative 
“actions inconsistent with the [plans’] provisions.”145 The Court made 
clear, however, that the plans’ statements about future agency action— 
such as the statement in one plan that a particularly vulnerable area 
would “be monitored and closed [to off-road vehicle use] if war-
ranted”146—were merely “‘will do’ projections of agency action,” not 
binding and enforceable commitments.147 The Court therefore con-
cluded that neither the FLPMA nor the Southern Utah land manage-
en
es, therefore, this is a 
se
m t plans require discrete agency actions with respect to off-road vehi-
cles and consequently, the agency’s failure to take any such action is 
immune from review under APA section 706(1).148 
 For our purposes, it is important first to note that the BLM’s fail-
ure to prohibit off-road vehicle use in the Southern Utah WSAs had the 
same practical effect as a regulation affirmatively permitting the activ-
ity: off-road vehicle use is permitted in the WSAs. By proceeding via 
inaction, however, the BLM shielded its decision from judicial review. 
An affirmative decision to allow off-road vehicles could have been re-
viewed for consistency with the FLPMA under APA section 706(2),149 
whereas the decision not to disallow off-road vehicles lies outside the 
scope of section 706(1).150 For all practical purpos
ca  in which an agency made a decision about off-road vehicle use and 
then, deliberately or otherwise, “shelter[ed] its own decision[] from 
abuse-of-discretion appellate court” oversight.151 
                                                                                                                      
143 Id. at 64. 
144 Id. at 66. 
145 Id. at 69. 
146 Id. at 68. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147 Id. at 72. 
148 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72. 
149 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall—(2) hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— . . . (C) in excess of statu-
tory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . . .”). 
150 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72. 
151 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 840 (2010). 
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 The outcome in SUWA thus sends a peculiar message to the BLM: 
if you choose to permit a particular activity in wilderness study areas, 
implement that policy choice by declining to regulate the activity—a 
course of (in)action that cannot be second-guessed by courts. More-
over, if you write a management plan for a WSA, make sure that plan is 
rat
ty, though, is more 
sid
alysis in SUWA is quite thorough, the Court 
eve
 We begin the discussion by applying our four-part rubric. As dis-
cus
st egic and aspirational, and makes no binding commitments to fu-
ture action.152 Indeed, SUWA sends that message to all agencies, not 
just those that manage federal lands. As long as an agency’s inaction 
does not amount to a “fail[ure] to take a discrete . . . required . . . action,” 
the policy choices underlying that inaction remain unreviewable. 153 
 SUWA’s message is peculiar for two reasons. First, as already noted, 
the decision provides agencies with a roadmap for achieving certain 
concrete regulatory outcomes (such as permitting off-road vehicle use) 
with minimal court oversight. The second peculiari
in ious. The very legitimacy of administrative regulation hinges on 
public participation,154 yet SUWA encourages agencies to implement 
their choices via inaction where possible, thereby not only evading 
court review but also eliminating any opportunity for the public to hear 
about and attempt to influence those choices.155 
 Although the APA an
n r squarely addresses the questions we raise here—namely, whether 
the BLM’s objection to APA review inappropriately aggrandized agency 
power at the expense of Congress, the courts, or the objects of regula-
tion. Addressing those issues is critical, we submit, to deciding agency 
inaction cases like SUWA. 
sed below, we ultimately agree with the Court’s opinion—nothing in 
the Constitution, we conclude, obligated the SUWA Court to address 
                                                                                                                      
152 Indeed, in 2005, the Forest Service made this new approach explicit, issuing a post-
SUWA rule that “emphasize[s] the ‘strategic’ nature of land management plans,” which 
from o specific projects, merely ‘characteriz[e]’ future conditions 
and pro
. 
ge waste of taxpayer dollars”). 
 2005 on will “authorize n
vid[e] ‘guidance’ for future decisions.” Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Nor-
ton v. SUWA and the Unraveling of Federal Public Land Planning, 18 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
F. 105, 111 (2007) (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219 (2010)). 
153 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64. 
154 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (requiring public notice-and-comment prior to 
adopting regulations); Blumm & Bosse, supra note 152, at 108 (noting that FLPMA “re-
flect[s] a federal commitment to public involvement, congressional oversight, and long-
range planning as the central tenets of public land decision making”)
155 See Blumm & Bosse, supra note 152, at 106 (arguing that “Congress created modern 
federal land planning as the cornerstone of greater public involvement in public land 
decision making,” but SUWA “and its aftermath have destroyed that vision, making public 
land plans virtually irrelevant and a lar
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the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.156 In this and many other review-
ability cases, our rubric leads to the same outcome as the standard re-
viewability analysis. That fact does not, however, undermine the impor-
tance of the rubric. Our aim is not to obligate courts to hear a signifi-
cantly larger percentage of cases challenging agency action, but rather 
to ensure that agencies cannot manipulate courts into declining review 





w h a decision to delay or deny review would undermine the agency’s 
constitutional legitimacy or infringe the parties’ rights. 
 On the facts of SUWA, we can dispense quickly with two of the four 
prongs of our rubric—Article III and individual rights infringement. 
First, even assuming that Article III protects an inner sphere of court 
jurisdiction, review of agency inaction certainly falls outside that sphere. 
Court review of agency inaction is not necessary to preserve the Su-
preme Court’s “essential role” of maintaining the supremacy and uni-
formity of federal law.157 Nor is court review necessary to protect the 
due process rights of the plaintiff in an inaction suit,158 who (by defini-
tion) raises the third-party harm of a regulatory beneficiary rather than 
the first-party harm of a regulatory object (no regulatory object would 
think to complain of the absence of regulation).159 Thus, t
se on that its decision not to regulate off-road vehicle use is unreview-
able does not unconstitutionally infringe on the power of the courts. 
 Second, and relatedly, nothing in the SUWA decision raises due 
process concerns. Neither SUWA nor the other environ
                                                                                                                      
156 See infra notes 158–175 and accompanying text. See generally Bressman, supra note 
14, at 1709–10 (similarly concluding that SUWA was rightly decided, though suggesting 
that the Court did not pay adequate attention to the potential for agency arbitrariness 
imp
al Power over 
the A




regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. 
Id. 
licit in every decision not to act). 
157 Hart, supra note 60, at 1364–65; see also Leonard G. Ratner, Congression
ppellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 161 (1960). 
158 See Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Li-
mitations on Con
6 (1981). 
 Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). 
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inac-
tion, the nature and extent of facts that must be . . . proved . . . to establish 
standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object 
of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little 
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judg-
ment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, . . . a 
plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly un
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plaintiffs have liberty or property interests in the management of the 
Southern Utah WSAs that comprise only public lands.160 
 Applying the nondelegation prong of our rubric to SUWA is some-
what trickier. We must assess whether Congress could constitutionally 
delegate to the BLM the discretion to implement land management de-
cisions through inaction. As we have noted, this question has four sub-
parts: (1) whether Congress improperly delegated true lawmaking pow-
er; (2) whether the FLPMA provides an intelligible principle to con-
strain the BLM’s discretion in making its substantive land management 
choices; (3) whether, in allowing for the possibility of unreviewable 
                                                                                                                     
agency inaction, the FLPMA improperly delegated judicial responsibili-
ties to the Executive; and (4) whether the FLPMA provides an intelligi-
ble principle to constrain the BLM’s discretion in making choices—like 
the choice not to act—that have implications for the scope of judicial 
review.161 
 The first two questions have straightforward answers. This type of 
agency discretion—the freedom to choose how to achieve a particular 
statutory objective—lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s functional 
nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence. That jurisprudence permits 
flexibility and encourages interbranch coordination to cope with in-
creasingly complex regulatory structures and ever-changing circum-
stances.162 True, Congress must lay down an intelligible principle to 
 
160 See supra notes 113–132 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
162 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[O]ur [nondelegation 
doctrine] jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increas-
ingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress 
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general direc-
tives.”); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
The legislative process would frequently bog down if Congress were constitu-
tionally required to appraise before-hand the myriad situations to which it 
wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for 
each situation. Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreason-
able and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules; it then 
becomes constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general 
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this dele-
gated authority. 
Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 105; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) 
(“The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary 
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function . . . .”); 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“In determining what 
[Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of 
that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of 
the governmental co-ordination.”). 
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guide and confine the agency’s discretion in achieving the statutory 
objective, but the FLPMA easily satisfies that test: section 1782(c) of the 
ct r
r that does not impair their suit-
bili
cising its legitimately granted and 
rop
                                                                                                                     
A equires the Secretary of the Interior to exercise his discretion in a 
manner that “prevent[s] unnecessary or undue degradation of the 
lands and their resources” and does “not . . . impair the suitability of 
[the WSAs] for preservation as wilderness.”163 These guidelines easily 
meet the Court’s permissive definition of “intelligible principle.”164 
 The third subpart of our nondelegation analysis leads us into less-
charted waters. In the FLPMA, Congress delegated to the BLM the dis-
cretion to manage WSAs in a manne
a ty for preservation.165 That discretion must encompass the free-
dom not to act, as the BLM must at minimum have authority to decide 
which of various threatening land use practices deserves its immediate 
regulatory attention, and which can be monitored for a time until their 
consequences are better understood. 
 Yet the BLM’s decision not to regulate affects more than the man-
agement of the WSAs; as seen in SUWA, the decision also has implica-
tions for the scope of review.166 Whether Congress can expressly dele-
gate this type of jurisdiction-altering discretion is unclear. We submit, 
however, that in this case the BLM’s exercise of authority over the scope 
of court review is unproblematic because it is entirely ancillary to the 
execution of Congress’s nonimpairment mandate,167 and the execution 
of that mandate is adequately constrained by the intelligible principles 
identified above. In other words, in SUWA the BLM did not choose a 
form of action (namely inaction) primarily for the purpose of curtail-
ing court review. Rather, in exer
p erly constrained authority over the management of public lands, 
the BLM chose not to take action with respect to off-road vehicle use, 
and that choice then had ramifications for the scope of review— rami-
fications that SUWA and the other plaintiffs undoubtedly lament, but 
that raise no nondelegation issue. 
 That brings us to the underdelegation question in SUWA, which is 
the heart of our analysis. Underdelegation turns on whether Congress 
 
163 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2006). 
164 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2000); see also supra notes 
70–71 and accompanying text. 
165 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). 
166 See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64. 
167 Cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that agency lawmaking, 
which is ancillary to execution of laws, does not violate the nondelegation doctrine be-
cause a certain amount of lawmaking inheres in the power to execute). 
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intended to give the BLM discretion to choose an unreviewable form of 
action in implementing the FLPMA. If Congress did not intend to give 
e 
e 
 In short, because the FLPMA provides no express direction to the 
BLM  accomplish any specific task in any particular manner, Congress 
is f e details of implementation to the 
BL is includes the authority not to take certain actions, even if 
tho ss’s goals.175 And, in 
                                                                          
th BLM such discretion, then there is a clear underdelegation prob-
lem. If, on the other hand, Congress intended, even implicitly, to give 
the BLM the freedom to decide how to achieve the statutory goals set 
by Congress, including the freedom to achieve those goals via inaction, 
then there is no underdelegation issue. 
 The language of the FLPMA leads us to the latter conclusion. First, 
the Act gives the BLM considerable discretion about how to achieve its 
goals: “in managing the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or 
otherwise take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue deg-
radation of the lands and their resources or to afford environmental 
protection.”168 This broad language leaves the BLM with room to decide 
both whether an action is required and, if so, whether to act “by regula-
tion or otherwise.”169 Second, nothing in the FLPMA itself envisions 
broad judicial review of land management decisions—rather, plaintiffs 
must turn to the APA to challenge BLM actions.170 That is, the FLPMA 
does not include the sort of expansive judicial review provisions that 
might lead a court to conclude that Congress did not intend to grant 
th agency authority to shield its choices from outside oversight.171 Fi-
nally, by limiting judicial review of agency inaction to cases “where a 
plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete action that it is re-
quired to take,”172 the APA itself buttresses the conclusion that Congress 
intended agencies like FLPMA to have the freedom to decline to act.173 
 to
eemed to have delegated thairly d
M.174 Th
se actions would arguably help achieve Congre
                                            
173
174
175 ., 529 
U.S. 1 ., 467 
U.S. 8 anch 
Problem
ss has not spoken clearly about how it wishes the law to be adminis-
 default to the Executive—ordinarily in the form of an admin-
 
168 U § 1782(c) (emphasis added). 
169 Id. 
170 See id. 
171 See id.; see also supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text. 
172 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64–65. 
43 .S.C. 
 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006). 
 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2006). 
 See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63–65; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp
20, 159 (2000) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc
37, 844 (1984)); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Br
, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831, 870 (2001). 
If Congre
tered, it falls by
2011] What Agencies Can (and Can't) Do to Limit Judicial Review 1721 
turn, the authority not to act necessarily encompasses the subsidiary 
authority to shield some implementation decisions from judicial review 
by choosing not to act. 
 In sum, although we question the wisdom of the message that SU-
WA sends to land use planners for the reasons discussed above, we con-
clude that neither separation of powers nor due process concerns re-
quired the Court to reach the merits of SUWA’s claims. Thus, the Court 
reached a constitutionally sound outcome even as it acquiesced in what 
could well have been a strategic attempt by the BLM to achieve a regula-
tory outcome (continued off-road vehicle use in WSAs) without court 
oversight. 
B. Ohio Forestry: The U.S. Forest Service’s Ripeness Argument  
Betrays Congressional Intent 
 We reach a different conclusion, however, in Ohio Forestry.176 In 
that case, the U.S. Forest Service successfully wielded the ripeness doc-
trine to shield from judicial review a final, ten-year Land and Resource 
Management Plan (“Plan”) for Ohio’s Wayne National Forest.177 Re-
quired by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), forest plans 
like the one at issue in Ohio Forestry are used to “guide all natural re-
source management activities” within the covered forest.178 They pre-
scribe the total amount of logging that may take place in the forest, the 
location of that logging, and the type of harvesting that may be em-
ployed, though they do not authorize any particular logging activity.179 
The Wayne National Forest Plan, for example, allowed for logging on 
126,000 of the forest’s 178,000 acres, and capped the total amount of 
timber that could be taken off the land at roughly 75,000,000 board 
feet.180 The Plan estimated that within ten years logging would take 
place on roughly 8000 acres, 5000 of which would be subject to “‘clear-
cutting’” —the “indiscriminate and complete shaving from the earth of 
                                                                                                                      
istrative agency—to make the policy choices necessary to giving concrete con-
tent to the law. . . . It is perfectly consistent with the Constitution for the Pres-
ident to exercise that power, because Article II devolves upon him not only 
the duty but also the power to execute the laws. That is the theory, at least, of 




176 523 U.S. at 729–30. 
177 Id. 
178 36 C.F.R. § 
179 See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 729–30. 
180 Id. at 729. 
1722 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1687 
all trees—regardless of size or age—often across hundreds of contigu-
ous acres.”181 The Plan did not authorize specific logging projects, but 
it plainly “ma[de] logging more likely” because without the Plan no 
tree could be cut.182 
 As encouraged by the NFMA, the Sierra Club and the Citizens 
Council on Conservation and Environmental Control (together “the 
Club”) participated in all public phases of Plan development.183 At the 
end of the day, however, the Club objected to the Plan’s contents and 
led
 before allowing any 
rt
                                                                                                                     
fi  suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
asserting that “erroneous analysis le[d] the Plan wrongly to favor log-
ging and clearcutting.”184 The Club lost on the merits before the dis-
trict court but prevailed on appeal to the Sixth Circuit.185 
 When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the Court 
unanimously concluded that the Plan was not ripe for judicial review.186 
The Court applied the traditional ripeness test, which focuses on the 
“‘fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and the ‘hardship to the par-
ties of withholding court consideration.’”187 In the Court’s view, delay-
ing judicial review would not prejudice the Sierra Club, whereas imme-
diate review would interfere with the Forest Service’s statutory preroga-
tive to amend its overarching logging plan
pa icular logging project to go forward.188 Finally, the Court noted 
that considerations of efficient judicial administration counseled in fa-
vor of delaying review to permit the controversy to develop into a more 
concrete dispute about particular stands of trees.189 
 The Court did acknowledge two “exceptions to the traditional 
ripeness analysis [that] embody a deference to the legislative process”: 
situations in which Congress either (1) provided expressly for preim-
plementation review of agency rules, or (2) prescribed a procedure 
“the violation of which creates an immediate cause of action.”190 (An 
example of the latter is the environmental review process required un-
 
 523 U.S. at 730. 
3d 248, 252 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio For-
estry .S. 726. 
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181 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 749 n.7 (1972). 
182 Ohio Forestry,
183 Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.
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187 Id. at 733 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). 
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189 Id.; see also Amanda C. Cohen, Ripen
ation, Inc. v. Sierra Club for Environmental Litigation, 23 Harv. Envtl. L
1999) (detailing the Court’s analysis). 
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der the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).)191 In the Court’s 
view, however, neither exception applied to the Sierra Club’s challenge 
to the Wayne National Forest Plan, because (1) Congress did not ex-
pressly provide that forest plans be reviewable prior to implementation, 
and (2) the Club took issue with the Wayne Plan itself, rather than the 
Service’s failure to comply with a NEPA-like procedural requirement.192 
 ers 
of p a 
rigor  to 
any “
l 
s these benefits, turning the planning 
roc
                                                                                                                     
Like SUWA, Ohio Forestry creates perverse incentives for manag
ublic lands. There are many benefits to a system that mandates 
ous, highly specific, and comprehensive planning phase prior
public land decision making.”193 For example: 
The planning process attracts public attention when the focus 
of land management is on the resources an area possesses, not 
on the merits of a particular project. Without a project and its 
momentum, agency personnel are in a posture of unbiased 
managers rather than project proponents. Moreover, at the 
planning stage, with an areawide concentration and a focus 
on land resources, the cumulative effects of various potentia
resource developments can be evaluated without pressure 
from project sponsors. The planning process, in short, can 
encourage rational decision making in advance of specific 
land use decisions[] . . . [and] produce predictability . . . .194 
The Ohio Forestry decision ignore
p ess into an unreviewable procedural hurdle to be cleared— agen-
cies must comply with the letter of NFMA’s planning requirement, but 
the decision gives them free reign to ignore the provision’s spirit with-
out risk of judicial reprimand.195 
 What is even more insidious is that, while Ohio Forestry no doubt 
dissuades agencies from making any firm and specific—and hence re-
viewable—commitments in their otherwise unenforceable land man-
agement plans, the decision simultaneously gives agencies every incen-
tive to fill planning documents with as many overarching and nonspe-
cific management choices as possible.196 By doing so, agencies are able 
 
191 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
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7 (“Congress has not provided for preimplementa-
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m & Bosse, supra note 152, at 159. 
ote 189, at 557 (critiquing the Ohio Forestry decision). 
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192 See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 73
 judicial review of forest plans.”). 
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194 Id. 
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to entrench their choices at a point at which judicial review is not yet 
available.197 True, no trees fall as a result of these management deci-
sions; for forests, the plans typically set broad timber cutting goals and 
block out areas that will be open or closed to logging. Forest plans do 
have real world significance, though, because they determine routes for 
logging roads and other resource-allocation issues that have concrete 
implications for subsequent decisions about which trees to cut and 
when and where to cut them.198 Although courts may later have an op-
portunity to review individual logging permits, they are unlikely to have 
 weighs the inter-
ts 
                                                                                                                     
an opportunity to revisit these early and broad resource-allocation 
choices.199 It is therefore critical to ask whether allowing the Forest Ser-
vice to wield the ripeness doctrine as a shield to judicial review of its 
management plans comports with the structure of checks and balances 
that Congress built into the NFMA. 
 As with SUWA, we begin our analysis with a brief discussion of Arti-
cle III and individual rights infringement.200 Like the FLPMA, the 
NFMA implicates no Article III infringement concerns. In Ohio Forestry, 
the Supreme Court chose not to review the Forest Service’s land man-
agement plan after considering the interests of the parties, the agency, 
and the courts.201 The Court did not expressly indicate whether that bal-
ancing test was constitutionally required or instead more prudential in 
origin, but regardless, a balancing test that expressly
es of the courts mitigates concerns about executive encroachment on 
the judicial sphere.202 Likewise, precluding judicial review of the Plan 
did not violate Sierra Club’s due process rights because, as in SUWA, 
the stakeholders in Ohio Forestry lacked any liberty or property interest 
in the management of the Wayne National Forest.203 
 The nondelegation analysis again proves more complicated. In 
Ohio Forestry, the question is whether Congress could constitutionally 
delegate to the Forest Service the discretion to implement forest man-
agement decisions through unreviewable planning documents.204 We 
begin with the first two subparts of our nondelegation rubric—(1) 
whether the NFMA impermissibly delegates lawmaking power, and (2) 
 
companying text. 
restry, 523 U.S. at 733. 
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whether it provides an intelligible principle to limit the Service’s forest 
management decisions. These two questions pose no difficulty. First, 
the detailed management choices laid out in the Plan for the Wayne 
National Forest fall comfortably within the range of executive powers 
embraced by the Court’s functional nondelegation doctrine.205 In addi-
tion, the Forest Service, unlike Congress, has both the bandwidth and 
expertise to regulate federal land use through planning statements.206 
Further, the NFMA provides intelligible principles that properly limit 
e F
 the nature of planning 
ocu
                                                                                                                     
th orest Service’s authority to oversee federal lands through land and 
resource management plans. For example, the Act supplies detailed 
requirements regarding the criteria the Service may use in developing 
the plans, the degree of public participation required, and the manner 
in which the plans must be reviewed and revised.207 
 Next, we must ask whether the NFMA improperly delegates judi-
cial responsibilities to the executive, and whether it properly constrains 
any agency choices that have ramifications for the scope of judicial re-
view. It must be acknowledged up front that, by leaving room for the 
Forest Service to implement management decisions via unreviewable 
planning documents,208 Congress delegated to the Service some power 
over the timing of review of substantive land use choices—a power that 
is plainly judicial in nature. That said, we nevertheless conclude that 
Congress did not impermissibly delegate judicial responsibility to the 
Forest Service, and that the NFMA adequately constrains the Forest 
Service’s choices about when to proceed via an unreviewable planning 
document. The NFMA directs the Forest Service to begin its land use 
planning by writing overarching management plans for each forest.209 
The jurisdictional consequences follow from
d ments that anticipate logging but do not actually “authorize the 
cutting of any trees.”210 In other words, Congress has constrained the 
agency’s choice of form, giving the Forest Service little or no ability to 
manipulate the ripeness doctrine to evade judicial review.211 Therefore, 
the NFMA poses no nondelegation problem. 
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 That brings us, finally, to the underdelegation prong of our test. It 
is here that we begin to see the risk of unthinking application of stan-
dard reviewability doctrines. The Ohio Forestry Court’s application of the 
ripeness doctrine properly considered the interests of the parties, the 
agency, and the court.212 At no point, though, did the Court consider 
whether Congress intended the Forest Service to have the ability to 
shield some of its substantive policy choices from judicial review by en-
sconcing those choices in the required forest plans.213 True, the Court 
noted that Congress could have expressly provided for preimplementa-
tion review of those plans.214 But placing the onus on Congress to pro-
vide for preimplementation review reverses the usual presumption.215 
As we noted earlier, in other circumstances, the Court has been quite 
adamant that ambiguous statutory language should not be read to del-
egate to an agency the authority to shield its substantive decisions from 
vie
     
re w.216 Yet the Ohio Forestry Court read the absence of preimplemen-
tation language in the NFMA to do just that—to delegate to the Forest 
Service the authority to shield its substantive planning choices from 
review by including them in a document that makes important policy 
choices about the location, amount, and timing of logging but does not 
yet allow any trees to be cut.217 
 Had the Court recognized the need to consider congressional in-
tent before denying review, it might well have concluded that Congress 
intended to allow for preimplementation review of forest management 
plans. For example, the NFMA expressly requires the Forest Service to 
“provide for public participation in the development, review, and revision of 
                                                                                                                 
212 See id. at 733. 
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214 Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737. 
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the Court noted that “[s]ome statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the ‘agency 
action,’ and thus to be the object of judicial review directly, even before the concrete ef-
fects normally required for APA review are felt.” 497 U.S. at 891. As 
ult rule from Lujan is that an agency’s broad policy documents are not revie
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2011] What Agencies Can (and Can't) Do to Limit Judicial Review 1727 
land management plans”218 and to “appoint a committee of scientists 
who are not officers or employees of the Forest Service” to “provide sci-
entific and technical advice and counsel on proposed guidelines and 
procedures to assure that an effective interdisciplinary approach is pro-
posed and adopted.”219 It stands to reason, then, that Congress may have 
intended those stakeholders to be able to challenge the plans in federal 
court: Congress’s emphasis on collaboration and public accountability 
f re-
iew
review (or has created actionable procedural safeguards).222 As the 
                                                                                                                     
with respect to the development, review, and revision of forest manage-
ment plans evinces its intent to make those plans judicially enforceable. 
In other words, the text of the NFMA suggests that Congress intended to 
give stakeholders a right of judicial review, not to grant the Forest Ser-
vice the power to curtail review by acting via unenforceable planning 
documents.220 
 There is room for disagreement on this point. A court could rea-
sonably conclude that Congress did not intend to allow for preimple-
mentation judicial review of forest plans. Our argument does not hinge 
on the outcome of this analysis of congressional purpose. Rather, we 
seek only to emphasize that in reviewability cases, as in statutory inter-
pretation cases, “[s]eparation-of-powers concerns . . . caution . . . against 
reading legislation, absent clear statement, to place in executive hands 
authority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain.”221 To effectuate 
this principle in the ripeness context, courts should presume that im-
portant agency planning documents are ripe for review as soon as they 
are drafted, unless Congress has specifically instructed the courts not to 
review such measures prior to enforcement. Changing the ripeness 
analysis in this way would not dramatically expand the category o
v able agency actions, but it would better ensure that courts do not 
unwittingly allow agencies to shield from court oversight policy choices 
that Congress intended to be reviewable. Reasonable minds may dis-
agree over the correct reading of the NFMA, but whatever one’s views 
about that particular statute, application of our rubric would force 
courts to face head-on the important question of underdelegation. 
 The point is important enough to restate in different terms. In Ohio 
Forestry, the Court adopted a flawed default rule of reviewability: no pre-
implementation review unless Congress has expressly authorized such 
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Court recognized in Kucana, however, “plac[ing] in executive hands au-
thority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain” is an “extraordi-
nary delegation.”223 Consistent with the traditional “presumption favor-
ing interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative 
tio
 possibility 
that Congress intended, albeit implicitly, to allow immediate judicial 
review of c pt by an 




                                                                                                                     
ac n,”224 courts should not read statutes to accomplish such a delega-
tion “absent a clear statement” from Congress.225 In the absence of a 
clear statement, then, courts should presume that an agency lacks the 
authority to shield its policy choices from judicial review by imbedding 
those choices in preliminary and hence unripe planning documents. 
 Our rubric, applied in conjunction with the traditional ripeness 
analysis, solves this problem by forcing courts to address the
ertain agency actions. In such a case, any attem
w by wielding the ripenes
sh ld be considered an improper encroachment on Congress’s consti-
tutional prerogative to define and confine agency authority. 
C. Amador County: The D.C. Circuit Recognizes the  
Problem of Underdelegation 
 Finally, we turn to the Amador County case,226 in which the court 
considered the reviewability of the Secretary of the Interior’s so-called 
“‘no-action’ approval” of a gaming compact between the Buena Vista 
Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians and the State of California.227 The court 
concluded that the approval was reviewable,228 so we need not proceed 
through our four-part rubric to the assess separation of powers and due 
process implications of a counterfactual decision to curtail review. The 
decision is nevertheless relevant to this discussion because the court 
appears to have been concerned about the issue we call “underdelega-
tion” —that is, the absence of any statutory authority for the agenc
h  behind reviewability objections—yet the opinion itself is somewhat 
opaque on this point.229 The case therefore illustrates our dual claims, 
first that courts sometimes reach out to review ostensibly unreviewable 
agency actions out of concern about agency overreaching, and second 
that our rubric would provide a sounder footing for such opinions. 
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 Some background is necessary to understand the reviewability is-
sue in Amador County. As its name suggests, the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act (IGRA)230 regulates gaming on tribal lands.231 As relevant to 
Amador County, IGRA requires, among other things, that the gaming 
take place on “Indian lands,” and that it “be conducted in conformance 
with a tribal-state compact that has been approved by the Secretary” of 
the Interior.232 The Secretary may expressly approve the compact, or 




n is reviewable 
derives, of course, from SUWA: inaction is reviewable under APA sec-
                                                                                                                     
may implicitly approve it by “do[ing] nothing, in which case the com-
pact is deemed approved after forty-five days ‘but only to the extent the 
compact is consistent with the provisions’ of IGRA.”233 Alternatively, the 
Secretary may disapprove the compact, “but only if it violates IGRA[,] 
other federal law,” or other federal obligations.234 
 In Amador County, the Secretary approved, by inaction, an amended 
compact between the Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians and 
the State of California.235 Tha
T e’s request for compact approval within forty-five days, and he sub-
sequently published a notice of approval in the Federal Register in ac-
cordance with IGRA.236 Amador County then sued the Secretary alleg-
ing that the compact violated IGRA because it did not meet the Act’s 
“Indian lands” requirement.237 
 The Secretary argued that the County’s claims were unreviewable 
for a variety of reasons, only one of which is relevant here: that the no-
action-approval was not a reviewable agency action under 
70 1).238 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did not 
reach this issue because it found the no-action approval unreviewable 
for other reasons.239 The D.C. Circuit, though, relied on the structure 
of IGRA240 and the “strong presumption that Congress intends agency 
action to be reviewable”241 to find the approval reviewable. 
 The standard for deciding whether agency inactio
 
C. §§ 2701–2702 (2006). 
 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C)). 
 § 2710(d)(8)(D). 
. § 704. 
dor Cnty., 640 F.3d at 377. 
230 25 U.S.
231 Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 376. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. (quoting
234 Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B)). 
235 Id. at 377. 
236 Id.; see also 25 U.S.C.
237 Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 377. 
238 Id.; 5 U.S.C
239 Ama
240 Id. at 380. 
241 Id. 
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ti  706(1) only when “an agency failed to take a discrete agency action 
that it is required to take.”
on
ct” that violates 
242 The question for the Amador County court, 
therefore, was whether “approval of the Me-Wuk compact through in-
action fails [the] discreteness requirement” of SUWA.243 
In assessing this issue, the court focused on the fact that the IGRA 
limits the Secretary’s authority to approve a compact by inaction. Spe-
cifically, “compacts deemed approved through secretarial inaction be-
come effective ‘only to the extent the compact is consistent with the 
provisions of [IGRA].’”244 As a direct consequence of this limit on no-
action-approvals, the court continued, the Secretary of the Interior has 
“an obligation . . . to affirmatively disapprove any compa
IGRA.245 That obligation, in turn, means that when someone chal-
lenges an approved compact as violating IGRA, the court has “a dis-
crete agency inaction to review—the . . . failure to disapprove the com-
pact despite its [alleged] inconsistency with the Act.”246 
While internally consistent, this reasoning is too acrobatic to be 
particularly compelling, working backwards as it does from an affirma-
tive limit on no-action-approvals to an implicit agency failure to decide 
not to disapprove. Far more compelling is the evident underdelegation 
concern that underlies the court’s approach. In IGRA, Congress drew 
some lines about which kinds of compacts could be approved, which 
should be disapproved, and how the Secretary may signal approval. 
These lines turn on “consisten[cy] with” IGRA, which in turn requires 
interpretation of IGRA’s terms—necessarily a task for the courts.247 
Congress must therefore have intended the courts to play a role in re-
viewing the Secretary’s approvals and disapprovals—otherwise, there 
would be no opportunity for the courts to assess “consisten[cy] with” 
IGRA.248 But that in turn means that any approval or disapproval deci-
sion must be reviewable agency action—even a no-action approval. 
Otherwise, the Secretary could always escape review by issuing only no-
action approvals. In other words, Congress plainly intended the courts 
to play a role in reviewing IGRA approvals and disapprovals; permitting 
the Secretary to defy that intent by issuing unreviewable no-action ap-
242 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64. 




247 Id. at 380 (finding a necessary role for the courts because IGRA “provides that only 
lawful compacts can become effective,” and “someone—i.e., the courts—must decide 
whether those provisions are in fact lawful”). 
248 Id. 
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e agency’s policy choic-
es. Thus, we suggest, the Amador County court could have reached the 
same result (no-action-appro viewable) with greater clar-
y a
ed an administrative regime that expressly or 
implicitly anticipates expansive judicial review and an agency wields 
reviewability as a shield against court oversight, thereby threatening the 
legitimacy of both the governing regime and the agency’s role in im-
plementing that regime. 
provals would encroach on Congress’s power to delimit agency author-
ity and, in turn, undermine the legitimacy of th
vals must be re
it nd confidence by considering the separation of powers implica-
tions of the Secretary’s claim of unreviewability. 
Conclusion 
Agencies are not passive participants in court oversight of adminis-
trative action. Rather, they actively modulate oversight by structuring 
their actions in ways that may induce courts to delay or deny review. We 
argue that courts should recognize this tactical activity for what it is: 
executive curtailment of judicial review and, possibly, encroachment on 
legislative and judicial prerogatives. When a case squarely presents the 
question whether Congress may delegate to an agency the authority to 
shield its decisions from judicial oversight, courts almost universally 
recognize that such an “extraordinary delegation” would raise separa-
tion of powers concerns. Yet the same concerns lurk in the background 
of all so-called “reviewability” cases. In particular, these concerns arise 
when Congress has creat
